MR Review Essay

The Savage Wars of Peace

Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army

The U.S. military has a long history prosecuting what Rudyard Kipling labeled the "savage wars of peace." In many cases, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) carried these small, savage wars to successful conclusions. Max Boot's *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* is a history of the U.S. military's involvement in small wars and counterinsurgencies during the 19th and 20th centuries.[1]

Boot, a frequent contributor to *The Weekly Standard*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Los Angeles Times*, provides a valuable, topical addition to the existing corpus of books about small wars and insurgencies. Although this is Boot's first foray into the realm of U.S. military history, the American military should read this book because of the ongoing counterguerrilla warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lessons learned in Vietnam and other counterinsurgencies are germane to the small wars of today.

This extraordinary book has three parts: America's rise as a commercial and naval power; its emergence as a great power and its increased commitment to constabulary roles; and Vietnam's influence on the U.S. military's willingness to fight small wars. The book also draws conclusions about the kinds of wars America might face in the future.

Counterinsurgency Wars

Boot's most interesting chapter offers a colorful account of Stephen Decatur's exploits as an intrepid, swashbuckling naval officer whose leadership skills and actions were central to America's success during the Barbary wars. Discussions of America's emergence as a great power and Alfred Thayer Mahan's book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783*, conclude the book's first part.[2]

The second and largest part of the book, the most salient for students of small wars, examines the Boxer Uprising in China and ends with a discussion of U.S. constabulary operations in China at the outbreak of World War II. The importance of this part of the book is to illuminate accounts of the Army's counterinsurgency efforts during the Philippine Insurrection and the USMC's conduct of the Banana Wars.

Boot's account of the Philippine War is thorough and lucid as he explains the brutal methods perpetrated by insurgents and counterinsurgents. His conclusion highlights the key components of what was ultimately a successful counterinsurgency. He also captures the gruesome massacre of G Company, 9th Cavalry—"A bolo slash across his face filled in with strawberry jam to lure ants from the jungle." General Arthur MacArthur's response to intransigent insurrectos was to dust off and reissue Civil-War-era "General Orders 100," which essentially authorized the execution of captured combatants not in uniform.[3]

Boot also captures in detail Cuban veteran and U.S. Brigadier General Frederick Funston's daring, cunning raid into enemy territory to capture guerrilla leader Emilio Aguinaldo. According to Boot, the Philippine counterinsurgency was a success because the U.S. military used aggressive patrolling and force to pursue and crush insurgents, treated captured rebels well, and generated goodwill among the population by running schools and hospitals and improving sanitation.[4]

Three chapters of *The Savage Wars of Peace* are devoted to the USMC's experiences in constabulary and counterguerrilla operations in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. The experience gained during the Banana Wars was the genesis of the USMC *Small Wars Manual*, which Boot addresses in the short first chapter of part 3.[5] The most salient discussions stem from the USMC's constabulary and counterguerrilla efforts in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.

Boot introduces readers to Smedley Darlington Butler, an intriguing, resilient character who appeared in almost every USMC small war during the early 20th century. Boot tells us that Butler "was trained under the eye of an old sergeant major who had fought with Kitchener in the Sudan before retiring and joining the U.S. Marines." Butler also fought in the Boxer Rebellion and won a Medal of Honor at Veracruz. In Haiti, where Butler was appointed the first commandant of the gendarmerie, the United States established an indigenous constabulary led by USMC officers. In 1916 in the Dominican Republic, under the U.S. military governor, the Marines assumed control of the war, police, and interior ministerial functions and created an American-officered constabulary.

The book describes legendary Marine "Chesty" Puller as cutting his teeth in Nicaragua in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Puller led indigenous Guardia Nacional patrols on the hunt for Sandino and his guerrilla bands in the mountains and jungles. Boot encapsulates all the lessons the Marines gleaned from the Banana Wars into one pithy bumper-sticker saying: "Small wars cannot be fought with big war methods."[6]

Lessons Learned

The last part of the book looks quickly at the small wars lessons learned in the USMC *Small War Manual*, Vietnam's effect on the U.S. military's capacity to fight small wars, and lessons for the future. Boot explains that the *Small Wars Manual* reflected the valuable experience a

generation of Marines gained while conducting small-unit patrolling and constabulary operations in the Americas. His main argument is that the Marines are more intellectually supple because they were the first service to embrace and codify counterinsurgency in print. The Army has had as much experience fighting insurgents but "never bothered to develop a doctrine of antiguerrilla warfare because . . . the Indian Wars [were always viewed] as a temporary diversion from [its] real job—preparing to fight a conventional army."[7]

Boot's coverage of Vietnam is well done and accurate, but others have covered the same material many times elsewhere. Boot contrasts General William C. Westmoreland's big-unit war of attrition with another war that was more effectively waged under General Creighton Abrams, the USMC, and the Special Forces—a war with more emphasis on pacification, combined actions platoons, civil operations, and revolutionary development support, territorial forces improvements, and Phoenix.[8]

The chapter on how Vietnam affected fighting small wars is good but provides no new insight into the "specter of Vietnam." It can be summarized succinctly: the only lesson the Army learned from Vietnam was that counterinsurgencies and small wars are to be avoided. The Vietnam syndrome, the "body bag" syndrome, and the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine are prominent in this chapter.

The final chapter, "In Defense of Pax Americana," presages the savage wars of peace in the future and offers advice for a virtually imperial army: "America should not be afraid to fight the savage wars of peace if necessary to enlarge the empire of liberty. It has done it before." Boot asserts that the United States is the only power capable of performing the global policing role that Britain performed in the 19th century, and "without a benevolent hegemon to guarantee order, the international scene can degenerate quickly into chaos and worse."

The author's forecast for future small wars includes internal wars of other states, wars where soldiers act as social workers, and wars without exit strategies. More wars like Afghanistan and Iraq are probable, and Boot offers one more caveat: "If the U.S. is not prepared to get its hands dirty, then it should stay home."[9]

Implications and Other Comments

For most of the 20th century, the U.S. military (notwithstanding the USMC's thinking about small wars) has generally embraced the big, conventional, war paradigm and fundamentally eschewed small wars and insurgencies. Thus, instead of learning from its experiences in Vietnam, the Philippines, the Banana Wars, and campaigns against the Indians, for most of the last 150 years the U.S Army has viewed these experiences as ephemeral anomalies and aberrations—distractions from preparing to win big wars against other big powers.

As a result of marginalizing counterinsurgencies and small wars, the U.S. military has spent most of its existence espousing prosecuting big-war cultural preferences, hindering it from fully studying, distilling, and indoctrinating the extensive lessons small wars and insurgencies have provided to better face current and emerging insurgencies. Today's military leaders are transforming to an adaptive mindset that embraces counterinsurgency and small wars. With this change, however, comes the imperative to learn and build from past lessons. Studying *The Savage Wars of Peace* is a good place to begin.

An otherwise outstanding, interesting book, *The Savage Wars of Peace* has two weaknesses. First, Boot seems too enamored of the U.S. Marines Corps, and as a consequence, his book lacks balance and omits actions during the Indian Wars and in El Salvador, both successful counterinsurgencies waged by the U.S. Army. Second, any work that examines the U.S. military's history of small wars, and one that refers to an "American way of war," should include among its sources the books of preeminent scholars and experts Russell F. Weigley, Sam Sarkesian, and Richard Shultz. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
2. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783* (New York: Dover Publications, 1987).
3. The Lieber Code of 1863, General Orders 100, on-line at <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/liebercode.htm>, accessed 8 September 2004.
4. Boot, 102.
5. U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (1940), available on-line at <www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/sw_manual.asp>, accessed 8 September 2004.
6. Ibid., 143, 153, 170, 244, 285.
7. Ibid., 283.
8. For a more thorough analysis, see Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1999), 1-44, 58-79.
9. Boot, 348, 350, 352.

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Rest in Peace, Major Conventional War

Lieutenant Colonel Lance R. Blyth, U.S. Marine Corps

In 1991, Martin van Creveld published his provocative work *The Transformation of War*, in which he argues that large-scale warfare between states, fought by armies, separate from populations (the Clausewitzian trinity) was on its way out.[1] Warfare in the future would be dominated by "nontrinitarian" forces "we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers." This view of the character of those who would dominate future opposition forces found further purchase in Ralph Peters' 1994 *Parameters* essay, "The New Warrior Class."[2] Peters notes that likely future enemies would not be soldiers, but warriors—"men of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil society."

Van Creveld's and Peters' predictions are now evident in current circumstances. The U.S. action in Afghanistan was not a conventional war waged by "new warriors" supported by a few special operations units and airpower. Yet the inability or unwillingness of civil and military leaders to understand the nontrinitarian nature of the conflict likely contributed to continued combat in Afghanistan.

U.S. forces conquered Baghdad, in 3 weeks, but the campaign barely resembled a conventional war. The coalition's fiercest opponents were irregulars, often foreigners, not Iraqi soldiers. Misunderstanding the unconventional nature of the war might well have contributed to the ongoing struggle. Van Creveld and Peters are proven accurate—if ignored—sages of future war, although I suspect neither would wish it so.

Future War

Given Van Creveld and Peters' unsought success at prediction, it is fitting that *Non-State Threats and Future Wars*, edited by Robert J. Bunker, includes essays by both men that revisit their seminal works.[3] The last decade has proved Van Creveld's thesis since any state capable of fielding a competent conventional army is equally capable of building nuclear weapons, making conventional war improbable, if not impossible. Van Creveld warns it is too early to completely claim the end of major conventional wars, especially in the Middle East. Nuclear proliferation might end major warfare in the region or lead to a nuclear holocaust. Either way, Van Creveld states, "May thou rest in peace, Major Conventional War."

Conventional forces continually demonstrated their inability to defeat nontrinitarian foes throughout the 1990s. The response of military establishments worldwide to nontrinitarian opponents and the end of conventional war has been the reaction of someone losing a loved one—denial and rejection. Finally, Van Creveld warns that we continue to misunderstand the nature of war, ignoring the most basic question of why men fight. War, at the lowest end of the spectrum, is often not the means to an end, it is an end in itself. Those who ignore this, Van Creveld warns, and "stick their heads in the sand might end up being kicked in the butt."

Peters adds terrorists to his consideration of the new warrior class, analyzing them as either practical, with rational, if ambitious, political goals, or apocalyptic—terrorists for whom no victory could ever be enough. Peters, apologetically plagiarizing his early work, lists five groups that make up the new warrior class: the underclass, course-of-conflict joiners, opportunists, hard-core believers, and mercenaries. All might be in evidence at one time as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Peters emphasizes the critical factor for winning against warriors—strength of will and an acceptance of killing and being killed. Peters does not doubt this factor's presence among the troops but is concerned with maintaining, as he says, "a discriminate appetite for killing" in a democratic society and government: "We face violent threats from heartless, ruthless men, and . . . we will need to kill them."

In the summer of 2001, Bunker, a law-enforcement consultant and professor of national security studies, invited Van Creveld and Peters to revisit their predictions as part of a project bringing defense and national security scholars together with military and law-enforcement officials. The aim of the project was to focus on the growing threat of nonstate entities and the shape of future war. Halfway through the project, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks occurred, and the future became the present. This realization permeates the first sections of the book—the preface by Phil Williams, the foreword by David F. Ronfeldt, and Bunker's introduction to *Non-State Threats*, the publication that grew out of the project.

Williams presents the optimism of the 1990s as an illusion, shattered by the 11 September attacks to reveal a new security environment. He describes the new reality as complex, with no separation into domestic and foreign concerns, and he no longer sees states as the sole threat. In the new reality, states have "smart enemies" who exploit the down side of globalization to transfer technology and expertise to "sovereignty-free actors." The response to these new threats must include better intelligence, new ways of thinking, and a reassessment of institutions and procedures of national security policy.

Ronfeldt sees U.S. adversaries as networked at organizational, doctrinal, technological, social, and narrative levels. He notes that hierarchies have difficulty fighting networks, that it takes networks to fight networks, and whoever masters the network first gains an advantage.

Bunker's introduction to *Non-State Threats* attempts to put the current situation into the broad strategic context of epochal change. His theory, developed with T. Lindsay Moore, posits transitions by Western civilization through three epochs, from city-states powered by human energy, to feudal states with animal energy, to national states powered by mechanical energy.[4] Transitions between epochs are periods of revolu-

tion in political and military affairs (RPMA) dominated by nonstate mercenaries and typified by a blurring between war and crime. We are now in one such period, a fourth epochal war dominated by nonstate threats, as we transition to a new epoch.[5]

Bunker's identification of nonstate threats is not original. There was a large body of work throughout the 1990s that gave birth to the terms "fourth-generation warfare," "nontrinitarian war," "transnational organized crime," "the new warrior class," and "netwar." Bunker ties nonstate threats to the epochal shift in political, military, and energy structures symbolized by the 11 September 2001 attacks and provides the glue for a wide-ranging collection of essays.

Nonstate Threats

Given the overlap between war and crime in the fourth epochal war thesis, Bunker gives close attention to threats associated with the growth of transnational organized crime. Mark Galeotti's essay predicts the 21st century's major security issue will be the struggle between an upper world of open economic, social, and economic systems and a networked underworld, "a very disorganized form of organized crime" using these institutions for its own ends. In this situation, the divide between national security and law enforcement is meaningless, as the battlefield created by a symbiosis between transnational crime and terrorists is a nation's political and economic systems.

The essay by John P. Sullivan and Bunker is more specific, discussing how drug cartels, street gangs, and warlords might be evolving into warmaking entities capable of threatening the state. Drug cartels have evolved from an aggressive competitor model to that of a subtle "co-opter." This could give rise to a criminal free-state that would render war between nation-states over issues of sovereignty as irrelevant.

Some street gangs evolved from purely local to international concerns, and a few might be global in scope. Warlords, the embodiment of a criminal free-state, exist in the vacuum created by weak political institutions and corrupt regimes. While most warlords are simply brigands, some operate on a regional scale, and a few have become "netwarriors" with a war-making organization that can challenge the nation-state.

Max G. Manwaring's case study of Colombia tests and finds support for many of these ideas. Manwaring borrows Joseph Nunez's concept that Colombia faces a nonstate "Hobbesian Trinity" of drug-trafficking narcos, insurgents, and paramilitaries. In 1982, insurgents, having failed to spark a leftist revolt in Colombia, turned to the narcos for financial support to bring about revolution by force of arms. The Colombian state's historical and intentional institutional weakness gave rise to private defense forces of paramilitaries, who also turned to drug traffickers for funding. These nonstate actors use terror with the goal of either controlling or substantively changing the Colombian political system. Manwaring notes, "Such nonstate actors using asymmetric terrorist strategies are pervasive in the world today."

Transnational crime, however, is not the only force that can give rise to nonstate threats. Jasjit Singh's case study of Kashmir and Pakistan demonstrates that states too can create nonstate threats. Singh notes that by the 1980s, after three conventional wars between Pakistan and India, terrorism emerged in Kashmir, partly because of the alienation of Kashmiris from India, but also because of the increasing Islamization of Pakistan in the 1970s. This resulted in the rise of a "jihadi" culture that accepted terror as a legitimate state strategy. Yet jihadi war abroad promoted ethno-sectarian violence at home, thus terror as a foreign policy became counterproductive for Pakistan. This explains Pervez Musharraf's support for the United States against the Taliban, although attacks by jihadis from Pakistan against the Afghan government continue, as do their threat to the state of Pakistan.

Thomas K. Adams' piece on private military companies cautions that not all nonstate actors are nonstate threats. As the 21st century began, Adams notes, states again found mercenaries useful. Mercenaries, who prefer the title of private military companies (PMCs), do not provide direct military services, but are businesses that operate with the consent of national governments. They exist because of the change in security conditions and are not the aberration that some claim; they are an "accommodation to reality." Adams does not see these new mercenaries as comprising a nonstate threat because their military power is miniscule compared to the weakest of states, and they depend on the nation-state for legitimacy and profit. Instead, given the historical importance of mercenaries in the RPMA, the PMCs might well constitute a strategy to deal with nonstate threats.

Counterstrategies

John B. Alexander and Charles Heal cover possible technological solutions, discussing the coming juxtaposition of nonlethal and hyperlethal weapons with a threat that is a convergence between war and crime. Such threats range from nonlethal millimeter-wave projectors to advanced lasers, which they admit would only be nonlethal against material targets, to orbiting aircraft armed with thousands of global positioning system (GPS)-guided munitions. Given the legal and ethical concerns associated with such weapons, strategies to employ them are critical.

Bunker offers three possible strategies. The first requires an understanding of battlespace dynamics.[6] Battlespace dynamics views war as taking place within defined space-time boundaries. Current battlespace is a four-dimensional box, but fifth-dimensional warfare (cyber, since it adds a barrier to human senses) is literally out of the box. By acknowledging the addition of a fifth dimension, battlespace dynamics attempts to overcome the threat dimensional asymmetric warfighting poses.

Bunker posits a strategy to link information warfare (defined as the defense and attack of information and information systems) to netwar, to speed up John Boyd's observe-orient-decide-act cycle. Bunker also suggests a strategy of bond-relationship targeting, defined as disruption of the bonds and relations that define a networks' existence. Such a strategy, however, faces problems when determining effects and its ethical use.

Russell W. Glenn, drawing on Mao Tse-tung's dictum of "fish and sea,"

recommends draining the increasingly urban seas in which nonstate threats swim and depend on for success. Different nonstate actors operate differently in the urban sea. Organized crime will attempt to control the seas, while terrorists swim among the unwitting enemy. Glenn's strategy calls for "water treatment" to remove elements in the urban sea the threat depends on to deny them success. Glenn's and Bunker's strategies, especially bond-relationship targeting, need accurate and timely information.

Matt Begert and Dan Lindsay propose a networked intelligence preparation for operations of information, surveillance, and assessment that is asymmetric since it looks for weaknesses and is intended to fuse with operations by speeding up the decisionmaking cycle. Sullivan too suggests the need for intelligence and command and control networks since nonstate threats will use networks to swarm and disperse; penetrate and disrupt; and elude and evade—what Ronfeldt calls "netwar."

Counternetwar will thus require police, military, and security services to understand the networked threat and to forge a balance between networks and hierarchies to defeat it. Sullivan presents the example of Los Angeles's terrorism early warning system that functions to provide indications and warnings and operational-net assessment and is meant to "bolt on" to existing hierarchies. He warns that nonstate actors and terrorists are neither separate nor distinct; they are simply the face of 21st-century warfare.

What is to be Done?

Military professionals should take away from *Non-State Threats* several themes that give rise to questions of what is to be done about 21st-century warfare. The first theme involves the relationship between epochal change, RPMAs, and the threat to nation-states from nonstate entities. All essayists agree with the fourth-epoch theory that the nation-state is ill-equipped to deal with nonstate threats.[7]

The nation-state, however, is neither a monolith nor is it immortal. Peter Bobbitt recently described the nation-state, whose role is to care for the welfare of its citizens, as transitioning in the developed world into a market-state, which seeks to maximize opportunities for its inhabitants.[8] This shift is not unique. Over the last 500 years, states have transitioned through several constitutional orders, resulting each time in an epochal war. The last ended with the Soviet Union's collapse. Since these epochs overlapped, revolution might be the wrong word to use when considering future war, and considerations of continuity might pay greater dividends.[9]

An evolutionary view might also suggest a number of strategies the state has against nonstate threats, especially transnational criminal organizations. A market-state, less concerned with welfare than opportunities, facing a threat from a drug cartel might legalize drugs to undercut the threat. If transnational criminal organizations are current or possible nonstate threats, analysts must consider long-term strategies to decriminalize their activities.

The blurring between war and crime is another theme. The essayists are clear that the military and law-enforcement officials face the same threat from nonstate entities. Connections between combat and enforcement, and the ability to shift between both, will continue to increase, suggesting it might prove necessary to return to the U.S. military's constabulary tradition.[10] Bunker suggests nonstate forces should be viewed like the raiders who "took down" the later Roman Empire. Such forces might also be seen as similar to the indigenous peoples who resisted European imperial and national expansion throughout the world from 1500 to 1900 and were often countered by "small expeditions of mounted men."[11]

Non-State Threats also suggests how "netwarriors" might be defeated. Since, as Ronfeldt notes, the strength of networks is their ability to function across organizational, doctrinal, technological, social, and narrative levels, it is possible to disrupt them at any of these levels. And, because in the scientific sense, networks are complex systems, disruption of one part might have wide-ranging consequences for the network as a whole.[12] Fighting netwarriors demands forces to be on the ground in the same battlespace as the level of the network they are attempting to engage and requires the enemy not be seen as a set of targets but as a group of people having to be persuaded, captured, or killed.[13]

The twin demands of an expeditionary presence and a constabulary role mean that infantry, in all its forms, from special forces to military police, will likely dominate U.S. military operations in the near future.[14] Conventional heavy forces, possibly equipped with advanced technology, will still be needed to deter or destroy other conventional armies, but they will probably operate in support of expeditionary forces.[15]

The shift in the constitutional order of states, the convergence of war and crime, and the challenges networked enemies present should not, for military professionals, obscure the fact that ground combat has not fundamentally changed. Maneuver supported by fire is still used to defeat an enemy at close range, and whoever is more skillful in combining arms and managing logistics will likely win.[16] This continuing reality, however, should not blind us to the evidence *Non-State Threats* presents that our fundamental understanding of war must change. Simply put, nonstate threats and state threats are not separate. They lie along the spectrum of warfare in the 21st century.

Terrorism must be viewed as war, not something separate from it.[17] Military historian John Lynn, rightly insists we need to alter the cultural discourse on war to include the reality of terrorism and, I would add, nontrinitarian war. Otherwise, battle becomes massacre, and we become what we fight.[18]

Why Men Fight

Van Creveld holds that we have misunderstood the nature of war, because we have misconstrued why men fight. With the exception of Peters, none of the book's essayists address this idea, and its absence illustrates the need to alter our thinking. Perhaps men fight simply because they are men. Consider if the U.S. military had realized Arab men exist in "narratives of honor," and when they are shamed, such as by the presence of foreign troops, they

can reclaim their honor only through violence.[19] If forces in Iraq had understood this, it is likely they would have been much better prepared to deal with ongoing attacks.

Evolutionary psychologists have long held that men fight because they have evolved to do so. Steven Pinker follows Thomas Hobbes in presenting competition (which drives natural selection), distrust (fear of other's motives), and honor (the need for individual self-worth in the community) as reasons why men fight.[20] These human needs go farther in explaining the current conflict than any international relations or root-causes theory and carry the uncomfortable realization that the current war might be a long one.

Non-State Threats and current events make it quite clear that while major conventional war might be dead, war is very much alive. Military establishments across the world must change if they are to deal with this new reality. The U.S. military's transformation must not make it just a high-tech conventional force but also a force that can adequately handle the challenges of nonconventional wars in the new century.

Non-State Threats should be widely read and discussed among military professionals, because Bunker and his contributors give us much to think about. Reading, reflecting, and acting on the ideas the essays present will help us begin the mental transformation that must precede any physical one. The lives of U.S. troops depend on our ability to comprehend the new realities of war. ***MR***

NOTES

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2. Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters* 24 (Summer 1994): 16-26.
3. Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Non-State Threats and Future Wars* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
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5. For more information, see Bunker, "The Transition to Fourth Epoch War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 78 (September 1994): 20-32, and "Generations, Waves, and Epochs: Modes of Warfare and the RPMA," *Airpower Journal* 10 (Spring 1996): 18-28.
6. Bunker, *Five-Dimensional (Cyber) Warfighting* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College [AWC], Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], 1998).
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11. Douglas Porch, *Wars of Empire* (London: Cassell & Co., 2000); C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3d ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1906, reprinted 1996); Edward S. Farrow, *Mountain Scouting: A Handbook for Officers and Soldiers on the Frontiers* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1881, reprinted 2000).
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13. Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," *Policy Review* 120 (August 2003), on-line at <www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan_print.html>, 7 August 2003, accessed 19 October 2004.
14. See also Colonel Robert Killebrew, "Deterrence with a Vengeance," *Armed Forces Journal International* 136 (October 1998): 76-81; "Reinventing the Army for the 21st Century," *Army* 50 (June 2002): 12-18; "Toward an Adaptive Army," *Army* 52 (January 2002): 21-26; General Frederick J. Kroesen, "The Future of Land Warfare: An Opinion," *Army* 52 (June 2002): 10-13.
15. Stephen Peter Rosen, "The Future of War and the American Military," *Harvard Magazine* 104 (May-June 2002): 29; Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 295-339. Barnett makes the distinction between a heavy "leviathan" force and an expeditionary "sys admin" one.
16. Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: AWC, SSI, November 2002). See also Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," *International Security* 21 (1996): 139-79; *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004). *Non-State Threats* also includes excerpts from interviews with Chechen commanders, who make this point quite clear.
17. Caleb Carr, *The Lessons of Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002).
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MR Letters

Strategic Leadership

Frank E. Pagano, *Director, Capstone, National Defense University, Fort McNair*—I recently read the article by Colonel Mike Flowers in the March–April 2004 issue of *Military Review* titled "Improving Strategic Leadership." The article's premise is support for the idea of expanding the scope and audience of the Army Strategic Leadership Course. While I would not challenge the overall idea of his thesis, he takes a gratuitous slap at the Capstone course (which I direct at the National Defense University) as a failure of general/flag officer leadership training. His criticism demands a response.

Capstone is the "chairman's course." Its Learning Areas (LAs) and Learning Objectives (LOs) are specifically outlined in [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 1800.01, *National Defense University Education Policy Instruction* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 July 2002)]. Nowhere in those LAs or LOs will you see the words "leadership" or "training."

The responsibility for developing leaders and leadership skills continues to reside in the services. We don't dedicate time to specific leadership training because it is available in so many other venues offered by each of the services.

Training and education are vastly different constructs. The best analogy I've ever heard to describe this difference is that of a football team. The team practices plays and does drills to prepare for the game (training) but when the quarterback brings the team to the line of scrimmage, his education and experience allow him to read the defense and adjust the plan to be successful. We're trying to continue the education of the quarterbacks.

Capstone is structured on an *Executive Education* construct. The essence of Executive Education is twofold; first, there are no products demanded from the "students" that determine whether they graduate or not (our only requirement is that

they show up). Second, and most important, they *get out of the course exactly what they put into it.* Capstone's efforts go into providing access to national and international leaders so our Fellows can interact with them to gain an insight into their challenges as they "sit in the leadership seat." Let's take Flowers' class as an example. Over the 6 weeks his class was in session, [students] met and had open discussions with the CJCS; all the "J-codes" on the Joint Staff; Vice CJCS; Secretary of Defense; all the Combatant Commanders whose HQs are in CONUS; senior officials in the NSC [National Security Counsel] and State Department; all five Service Chiefs; the Services' Operational Deputies; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of DIA [Drug Intelligence Agency]; as well as Senior Officials from NRO [National Reconnaissance Office], NGA [National Geospatial Agency], and NSA [National Security Agency].

The itinerary and access overseas were equally impressive, but I will admit there is a certain amount of "cultural" (a word we prefer to "tourism") activities. Our primary goals for the OCONUS trips are to expose the Fellows to all the elements of national power and to see the interagency in action in the field. It is our view and the view of the Senior Fellows (four-star retired officers who mentor our course) that exposure to a nation's culture and history is as important to a strategic leader's education as a brief on order of battle.

Flowers suggests that Capstone's only valuable leadership training is the "serendipitous" exposure to certain Senior Fellows. I contend that Capstone gives each of our fledgling general/flag officers many chances to speak directly and frankly with national and international [leaders] to enhance their education and contrast the formal training Flowers finds so attractive. It's up to them to take advantage of the opportunity.

Osama bin-Laden Interview

Ryan Henry, *Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Washington,* D.C.—Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein's article, "Osama bin-Laden Interview, June 1999: Entering the Mind of an Adversary" in the September-October 2004 *Military Review* is an insightful and useful piece. Keep up the good work!

Corrections

On page 26 of the September-October 2004 issue, "Targeting Decisions Regarding Human Shields," by Captain Daniel Schoenekase, U.S. Army National Guard, note 7 was omitted. It should read, "Peterson. Some volunteer human shields left Iraq before the war began because they were being located near purely military targeting. See *In America's Sights: Targeting Decisions in a War with Iraq,* Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/iraq-print.html>, accessed 6 March 2003."

On pages 47 and 50, Staff Sergeant George E. Anderson III's byline and bio should not have included the Ph.D. designation. Also, he is not Head of the Business Department of Valley Forge Military College; he is a business department instructor.

MR Book Reviews

SOLDIERS IN THE SHADOWS: Unknown Warriors Who Changed the Course of History, William Weir, New Page Books, Franklin Lakes, NJ, 2002, 288 pages, $24.99.

"History is made by many, many people, most of them unknown. This is an attempt to remember some of them," writes William Weir in *Soldiers in the Shadows: Unknown Warriors Who Changed the Course of History.* Weir highlights the actions of 10 soldiers he believes significantly affected the course of history, but who historians have virtually ignored.

Those Weir includes make up an eclectic group and range from pre-Civil War filibusterers to Indian chiefs to U.S. Army generals. Weir vividly recounts their adventures and accomplishments and assesses their places in history.

While I found the book entertaining, I believe selecting Colonel John Singleton Mosby and General Matthew Ridgway as "unknown soldiers" is a stretch, and the author's contention that these soldiers changed the course of history did not persuade me. Still, *Soldiers in the Shadows* is an intriguing book. Weir's writing style keeps the reader engaged and makes for great reading.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, *USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

CHINA AND THE LEGACY OF DENG XIAOPING: From Communist Revolution to Capitalist Evolution, Michael E. Marti, Brassey's Inc., Dulles, VA, 2002, 263 pages, $27.95.

China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From Communist Revolution to Capitalist Evolution is a succinct treatment of Chinese political maneuvering in the early 1990s. Indeed, the book is one of the most comprehensive narratives of the intricacies of factional politics of that time. The book is also a masterful reconstruction of the internal politics of the Chinese Communist Party and probably the best account we will have until appropriate documents are smuggled out or Party archives are opened to foreign researchers. That said, one must also ask, "So what?"

Michael E. Marti posits that when Deng Xiaoping returned to power in 1978 his goal was to make China a modern economic power by the middle of the 21st century. Marti theorizes that after retirement Deng realized the entire plan was in danger of becoming undone when the Party reasserted its power after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Deng marshaled his forces for a counter-

attack to secure economic change.

A "grand compromise" between the Central Party's administration, provincial governments, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ensured fiscal health, economic prosperity, and military modernization. Marti makes this point quite clearly and claims he is the first to have worked this out. He also states it was never Deng's intention to liberalize China's political system. All this is true, but most scholars recognized the latter point after the 1979 suppression of the Democracy Wall Movement. The links between military modernization and the PLA's continued support for economic reform became evident in the 1990s, although few before Marti were able to put this support in its proper context.

The book is useful as far as it goes. Unfortunately, it is a victim of academic inflation. Marti's points would have been better presented in an article. For example, in the early 1980s, many scholars realized the era of mass political campaigns in China was over when the campaign against spiritual pollution failed because of lack of popular interest. As the economy was reformed and the power of the danwei (work unit) decreased, the party's power of mass manipulation was ending.

The same could be said for the proliferation of communications outlets: various sources of information meant a decrease in the power of the central authorities to dictate what would happen in the provinces. The power the Party lost will be extremely difficult to regain. The Chinese Communist Party seems to be following the path blazed by the Guomindang—another Leninist organization—traveling down the road to economic prosperity and sociopolitical irrelevance. All this has been said in other venues: Marti breaks no new ground in announcing it here.

The book is valuable for its recounting of the way in which Deng saved his reform program and slowly eased the older leadership generations out of power. The retirement of this gerontocracy led to the so-called fifth generation of leaders now in charge of the Party and the country. However, it seems the leader of the fourth generation is reluctant to leave the political stage. The process Marti has so ably outlined enabled Deng to retire his opponents but has provided China with an orderly succession and transfer of power. This book covers a limited time span and makes no attempt to place Deng in the Chinese political and historical context of the last 150 years.

Lewis Bernstein, *Ph.D.*,
Huntsville, Alabama

AIRPOWER IN SMALL WARS: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2003, 521 pages, $45.00.

Despite catchy phrases like "surgical strike" and "precision bombing," airpower remains a blunt instrument in unconventional and small wars. Air strikes against guerrillas fail when guerrillas cannot be precisely located. Bombing civilians in retaliation (or error) is ineffective and counterproductive. The pre-World War II aviation concept of "air control," in which aviation occupies and controls a small country by airpower alone, is clearly outmoded and wrong. What then is the role of airpower in small wars?

James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson have a clear vision of this role and have written extensively on air and ground power. Corum is a reserve army officer and a distinguished historian and professor at the U.S. Air Force (USAF) School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Wray R. Johnson is a retired USAF colonel who spent a career in special operations and is now professor at the U.S. Marine Corps University.

Airpower has been a player in small wars and counterinsurgencies since French aviators bombed Moroccan rebels in 1913. Sometimes airpower has been a key player; at other times, it has promised much more than it could deliver. In the case of French Indochina, airpower's failure to deliver as planned at Dien Bien Phu lost the war for the French. *Air Power in Small Wars*, the first comprehensive history of the subject, analyzes numerous conflicts with guerrillas, bandits, rebels, and terrorists in colonial wars, police actions, counterinsurgencies, and expeditions.

The book's pre-World War II section describes General John J. Pershing's expedition into Mexico; U.S. Marine Corps expeditions into the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua; British Colonial expeditions in Somaliland, Aden, Transjordan, Iraq, and the Northwest Frontier Province of India; Spanish Colonial expeditions in Spanish Morroco; French Colonial expeditions in French Morocco and Syria; and Italian Colonial expeditions in Libya and Eritrea. The post-World War II section includes the Greek Civil War; the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign; the French Colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria; the British Colonial wars in Malaya, South Arabia, and Oman; the war in South Vietnam; southern African insurgencies in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Rhodesia and Malawi; Latin American insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Columbia; the Egyptian expedition in Yemen; the Soviet War in Afghanistan; and the Israeli excursion in southern Lebanon. While it is an ambitious undertaking, it succeeds.

Among the book's key findings are that in small wars, the political and economic instruments are often more important than the military instrument. Reconnaissance and transport are usually the most important and effective aviation missions in guerrilla war. Airpower's ground attack role becomes more important as the war turns conventional. Aviation high-tech and low-tech systems might play an important role in small wars. Joint operations are essential for the effective use of airpower. Small wars are long and intelligence-intensive. Training for major wars does not translate into readiness for small wars.

This is an important book and, hopefully, one on which ground power and airpower advocates can agree. Insurgencies, expeditions, and other small wars might occupy the attention of the U.S. Armed Forces in the near term. The time to prepare is now, and getting the air and ground component to work together harmoniously is part of that preparation. This book should be a basic component of that preparation and of that harmony.

LTC Lester W. Grau, *USA, Retired,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

NAPOLEON'S SHIELD AND GUARDIAN: The Unconquerable General Daumesnil, Edward Ryan, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2003, 432 pages, $34.95.

Aside from brief appearances in a few memoirs, most of Napoleon's subordinates appear only on canvas in splendid uniforms. The book fleshes out the life of General Baron Pierre Daumesnil, whose military career began when he ran away from home to join the Army. Daumesnil became a general before he was 33 and died in service to France as the governor of Vincennes in 1832.

Edward Ryan illustrates Daumesnil's career within the tactical and strategic environment that spanned his life, an era when demonstrated physical courage was rewarded and a soldier's moral courage and honor was tested routinely. History buffs will find this book well worth reading.

COL Arley McCormick, *USA,*
Retired, Huntsville, Alabama

THE DEVIL'S GARDENS: A History of Landmines, Lydia Monin and Andrew Gallimore, Pimlico, distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT, 2002, 234 pages, $19.95.

Based on a television documentary series, *The Devil's Gardens: A History of Landmines* explores the modern mine's history and the current state of a world gone mad with mine laying. The unintended damage from mines takes many forms, from the loss of agricultural land to maiming and death. Mines can last years beyond their original military intent and this weighs heavily against their intended use. The authors include many examples of mines causing accidental damage to civilians along with far fewer examples of successful and appropriate uses of mines.

The Ottawa Treaty (the convention on the prohibition of using, stockpiling, producing, and transferring antipersonnel mines and on their destruction); Princess Diana's support of de-mining efforts; the International Campaign to Ban Landmines; and the efforts of several other organizations have created pressure to rid the world of antipersonnel and antiarmor mines. Progress is slow because landmines are inexpensive; can be manufactured or acquired easily and quickly; require no monitoring, feeding, or other support; and can be buried and left. The Ottawa Treaty does not cover the use of scatterable mines, which can cover a vast area quickly; be placed on top of the earth or deep in sand and soil; and remain dangerous as unexploded ordnance long after their delivery.

During the Cold War, the superpowers participated, sometimes surreptitiously, in many battles (Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and generously supplied all sides with military aid, including mines. In many areas mine warfare is replacing massed armies facing each other across vast plains.

Mines are inexpensive force multipliers and easy to forget when the conflict is over. Too often, minefields have not been well marked, and when the fighting dies down, neither side has any idea of the extent of the mining that was done.

The United States leads the world in smart-mine technology. Smart mines use batteries and timers that eventually run down and render mines useless. Sensors allow them to be remotely activated and deactivated. In fact, the United States will not sign the Ottawa Treaty until an effective smart mine has been developed; however, the United States' determination not to sign the Ottawa Treaty has been criticized worldwide.

The book presents several vignettes on mine production, mine warfare's psychological effects, and the physical effects caused by stepping on a landmine. The authors provide several photographs of amputees, but there are no photographs showing the immediate effects of a mine blast.

The book poses many questions regarding the irresponsible use and proliferation of mines and provides a ray of hope that treaties and de-mining campaigns will end the landmine devastation of innocent civilians.

CPT Stephen R. Spulick, *USA,*
Schwetzingen, Germany

H JONES VC: The Life and Death of an Unusual Hero, John Wilsey, Hutchinson, London, 2003, 320 pages, $18.99.

John Wilsey's *H Jones VC: The Life and Death of an Unusual Hero* is an unusual book as military biographies go. Some readers might wonder why the life of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert "H" Jones is of sufficient interest to be the subject of a biography. As the last person to win the Victoria Cross for his actions during the Falklands War, he was notorious in British Army circles and much better known for the actions that led to his death than for a distinguished life.

Despite his lack of training as a writer or a historian, Wilsey has crafted a well-written and researched biography of fellow soldier Jones. Using primary sources, including letters Jones exchanged with his wife, Wilsey develops a vivid portrait of the man and the professional soldier and explains Jones' final action—the single-handed charge against an entrenched Argentine position that earned him the Victoria Cross.

Jones's story, which is interesting and moving, describes a particular British officer at a particular point in history. It also describes the modern British regimental system and Jones's successful rise. Perhaps no one is more qualified than Wilsey to provide that account. Wilsey served with Jones in the Devonshire and Dorset Regiment and subsequently became the Joint Commander of all British Forces in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

The book climaxes with an account of the battles around Darwin and Goose Green, which are also described in Mark Adkin's *Goose Green: A Battle is Fought to be Won* (Trans-Atlantic Publications, Philadelphia, PA, 1992) and Spencer Fitz-Gibbon's *Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green* (Lutterworth Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001). However, Wilsey adds significantly to what is known about the battle based on his own interviews with participants on the scene and at Joint Headquarters at Northwood. The information he gathered allowed him to evaluate some of the discrepancies between Adkin's and Fitz-Gibbon's accounts.

Jones, who commanded 2 Battalion, 2 Parachute Regiment (2Para), was killed while leading the Battalion into battle. The question for Wilsey is why Jones charged the trench when he did and whether his action

had the effect 2Para claimed. Did Jones deserve the posthumous Victoria Cross? While Wilsey accepts Fitz-Gibbon's interpretation that Jones's action was the product of the restrictive control British Army doctrine prescribed, his own interpretation comes from the context of Jones's personality and commitment to leadership by example. Wilsey never doubts Jones's charge turned the tide of the battle for Darwin Hill or that this action merited the Victoria Cross.

For students of the Falklands War, *H Jones VC* is a revealing portrait of a commander who did not live to write his own memoirs; it is the story of a father, a husband, a friend, and perhaps above all, a soldier and the decisions he faced. Although told through the sympathetic voice of a friend and colleague, Jones's story is a fair, objective portrait.

Robert S. Bolia, ***Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio***

Note: For more information about the Falklands War, see Bolia's article, the "Falklands War: The Bluff Cove Disaster," on page 64.

MEUSE-ARGONNE DIARY: A Division Commander in World War I, William M. Wright and Robert H. Ferrell, ed., University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2004, 174 pages, $29.95.

World War I general officers do not have the best reputations, but this unique book might change that. It is the only known diary of a major general commanding a division in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF).

Major General William M. Wright was a tireless commander who cared for the welfare of his troops, enforced discipline, and had an eye for detail. His diary refutes the myth that World War I generals were out of touch with the front line.

By the time Wright assumed command of the 89th Infantry Division, he had participated in the Santiago Campaign, the suppression of the Philippine Insurrection, and the Occupation of Veracruz. Wright assumed command of the 89th in France days before the St. Mihiel offensive, so he was in command for only the last 2 months of the war.

Major General Leonard Wood, who originally commanded primarily the Missouri-Kansas Division, remained behind as the 89th deployed to France under Brigadier General Frank L. Winn. By the time Wright took command, the division had been in theater for several months but had not been in any major combat operations.

Wright's diary begins when he received command of the 89th and continues through the Meuse-Argonne offensive—one of the largest and bloodiest battles in American history. Wright describes how the 89th held the line through the St. Mihiel offensive then suddenly changed direction and advanced toward the Meuse-Argonne.

Wright somehow managed to vividly document his experiences in a day-by-day diary during an engaging period. Ferrell edited the diary for grammatical and spelling correctness only, while notable scholars James J. Cooke and Russell Weigly advised him on additional historical information to enhance the reader's understanding. Ferrell also includes a personal memoir from Colonel Conrad S. Babcock, the highly successful commander of the 354th Infantry Regiment. The book's only shortcomings are three ineffective maps and the lack of operational graphics.

While not an in-depth critical analysis of a World War I division-level command, the book is a window on one man's experiences commanding a top division during two of the greatest battles of the AEF.

LTC Scott A. Porter, ***USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

COLLAPSE AT THE MEUSE-ARGONNE: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division, Robert H. Ferrell, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2004, 160 pages, $29.95.

In American military history, World War I has the misfortune of being stuck between two titanic periods of popular and scholarly interest: the American Civil War and World War II. In *Collapse at the Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division,* Robert H. Ferrell demonstrates there is still much to be written about the largely neglected war. He examines the 35th Division's experiences during World War I, concentrating on its battlefield performance during the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.

When organized in 1917, the division was composed of Kansas and Missouri National Guard units. Although Army inspectors noted the unit's soldiers were of excellent physique and high intelligence, its only combat operation was a disaster. After only 5 days of fighting in the opening phase of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the division rapidly became combat ineffective and on the verge of disintegration. Ferrell painstakingly uncovers the host of interrelated training and leadership problems that led the ill-starred division to its unhappy fate.

One reason for the 35th Division's poor combat performance was inadequate, poorly focused training. While forming at Camp Doniphan, Oklahoma, and while serving briefly in a quiet sector of the front once they arrived in France, the division's training concentrated mostly on fighting trench warfare. This training failed to prepare the unit for the realities of open warfare and led to much of the confusion that undermined unit cohesion during battle.

The division's greatest failure lay in grave lapses in its leadership and the poor command climate as a result of mistrust and tensions between the unit's Regular Army and National Guard officers. Ferrell places blame squarely on Regular Army commander Major General Peter E. Traub who sowed dissention and confusion within the unit by relieving all infantry brigade and regimental commanders (all National Guardsmen) and replacing them with Regular Army officers only days before major combat action in the Meuse-Argonne.

Ferrell maintains that once the 35th Division entered combat, Traub's inability to understand the changing battlefield situation; his failure to make timely, judicious decisions; and his unwillingness to stand up to General John J. Pershing's constant demands pushed the unit's brittle morale beyond its breaking point. These leadership failures, combined with the division's inadequate training and inability to keep the doughboys supplied with basic necessities led to the unit's collapse, its removal from the battle, and its assignment to a quiet sector of the front for the remainder of the war.

Collapse at the Meuse-Argonne is an excellent study of the interrelationship of leadership, training, morale, and unit cohesion. It offers the military professional a cautionary

tale on how quickly a unit composed of good soldiers can turn into a mob when they perceive their leaders are out-of-touch, indifferent, or too career-focused. While Ferrell focuses only on the 35th Division's ills, many of the other AEF divisions were also plagued with systemic problems that blunted combat effectiveness.

Hopefully, Ferrell's work will encourage other scholars to reexamine the AEF's performance and the challenges the Nation's first great expeditionary Army faced. The work's only major shortcoming is poor maps, which make it difficult to follow the ebb and flow of the battle.

LTC Richard S. Faulkner, *USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

VICTORY IN VIETNAM: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, Merle L. Pribbenow, trans., University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2002, 494 pages, $49.95.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of books have been written about the Vietnam War, most from the American perspective. Declassified intelligence documents, official Hanoi press releases, and a handful of books by North Vietnamese leaders were available, but these gave an incomplete, sometimes distorted picture. *Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975*, helps bring the picture into better focus.

Merle L. Pribbenow, a linguist and CIA staff officer from 1968 to 1995, with 5 years service in Saigon, masterfully translated this book, rendering as accurately as possible the voice of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Consequently, while heavily laced with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and Socialist propaganda, the book offers unique, often surprising insights.

In the introduction, William J. Duiker, Professor Emeritus of History at Pennsylvania State University, dispels some misconceptions about the war, revealing that many of the accepted truths in U.S. history books are simply wrong. He says, for example, "A number of questions remain unanswered, but one of the more pernicious myths about the Vietnam War—that the insurgent movement in South Vietnam was essentially an autonomous one that possessed only limited ties to the regime in the North—has been definitely dispelled."

North Vietnam was fighting a total war and viewed the fighting in Laos and Cambodia as part of a regional conflict. South Vietnam and the United States fought a defensive war in which actions in Cambodia and Laos were seen as separate struggles. While the United States imposed limitations on its actions, North Vietnam did not recognize international borders and used this fact to strategic advantage.

North Vietnam claimed it was fully aware of America's limited war strategy and knew America could not win with two hands tied behind its back. Communist historians admit the outcome had been close and acknowledge the Tet Offensive did not go well: "The political and military struggle in the rural areas declined and our liberated areas shrank . . . and most of our main force troops were forced back to the border or to the bases in the mountains."

Apparently, the strategy following U.S. General Creighton Abrams' rise to command was working much better than thought: "From the enemy's standpoint, during 1969-1971, the United States and its puppets successfully carried out a significant portion of their plan to 'pacify' the rural lowlands."

The book concludes with a self-congratulatory discussion of events that led to the fall of Saigon in April 1975. Interestingly, there is little mention of PAVN's "international brothers," the Soviet Union and China, who supplied military equipment.

This is an important but ponderous book, but if one can endure the Communist bombast, it is well worth reading. A debt of gratitude is due Pribbenow and the University Press of Kansas for making this unique addition to the history of the war available.

LTC James H. Willbanks, *Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

JOHN PAUL JONES: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy, Evan Thomas, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2003, 400 pages, $26.95.

America seems to have rediscovered its Founding Fathers, if recent bestseller lists are any indication. As much as the infant republic needed thinkers and statesmen like Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Benjamin Franklin, it also needed "founding fighters" to turn aspirations into reality. Francis Marion, Daniel Morgan, "Mad" Anthony Wayne—even Benedict Arnold—were among the warriors who translated fine words and ideas into concrete battlefield deeds. One more name belongs on this fierce list—John Paul Jones, the Father of the U.S. Navy.

Although Jones probably did not issue the celebrated declaration, "I have not yet begun to fight," during the epic sea battle between the *Bonhomme Richard* and *HMS Serapis*, he possessed an unconquerable spirit, and he did turn a stirring, immortal phrase when he wrote to a patron that he needed a fast ship, "for I intend to go in harm's way." Go he did, unlike many other captains in the Continental Navy.

Evan Thomas, a *Newsweek* editor and amateur sailor, limns a marvelous portrait of a proud, insecure, ferocious, highly ambitious figure. He suggests that Jones was most elemental of American characters—the self-made man. The penniless son of a Scottish gardener, on the run from the law, Jones adopted a new surname and came to America.

Possessing an unslakable thirst for glory, a genius for seamanship, a combative nature, and a Gatsby-like desire to be recognized as a gentleman, Jones offered his services to the cause of American independence. Along the way, he accumulated many grievances—some imagined, many justified. He felt underappreciated and unrewarded by Congress. While watching desirable commands given to corrupt incompetents, he suffered mutinous crews and disloyal officers. Indeed, comparing him to Benedict Arnold is instructive: both gifted men were at times disgracefully ill-used. The big differ-

ence is that Jones ultimately placed duty over self.

In Thomas's hands, the story of this courageous master and commander is as enthralling and humorous as any Patrick O'Brien novel. Thomas writes colorfully of blackguards and mistresses, salty sea dogs and young midshipmen, bloody quarterdecks and Parisian salons. He provides a thrilling description of Jones's apotheosis, the *Bonhomme Richard-Serapis* duel. His depiction of riding out a terrific storm is better than the obligatory chapter found in fictional yarns, as are the evocations of the sights, sounds, and smells of shipboard life in the age of sail.

Thomas perceptively evaluates Jones as a tactician, strategist, and leader. Unparalleled at first, Jones was surprisingly advanced as a strategic thinker who devised schemes to bring the war to the British home islands, foreseeing the need for America to field a blue-water navy.

Only as a strategic leader was Jones wanting. Audacious, persistent, and visionary, the brittle Jones lacked what today we call team-building skills to inspire subordinates to greatness. Nevertheless, Jones's legacy is well summarized by the words engraved on his tomb at Annapolis: "He gave our navy its earliest traditions of heroism and victory."

COL Alan Cate, *USA, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania*

THE RECKONING: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein, Sandra Mackey, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 2002, 396 pages, $27.95.

One of the more recent books on Iraqi society and politics after 11 September 2001 is Sandra Mackey's *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein*. Mackey also has written books about Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Lebanon and reported for the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* from the Middle East.

The book explores culture clashes in Iraq that make the creation of a national identity extremely difficult. Defining what it is to be an Iraqi is the focus of the first chapters. Leaders have played the Islamic, Mesopotamian, Arab, tribal, and military cards to gain rule and maintain power. When Britain created modern Iraq after World War I, it drew lines on the map with complete disregard for the geographic concentrations of the various minorities, and when they placed King Faisal I on the throne, they created a Sunni-dominated government to rule a Shi'a majority.

Mackey points out that Saddam Hussein did not create the military state in Iraq. That honor goes to Iraqi General Bakr Sidqi who in 1936 surrounded himself with a cadre of officers who believed Iraq needed an Attaturk or Reza Shah to save it from petty politics and foreign domination. Sidqi was considered a hero in Baghdad for massacring Iraq's Christian Assyrian minority. As acting army chief of staff, he sent four Iraqi single-engine planes to bomb the Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and a post office. He then orchestrated the murder of Defense Minister Jafar al-Askari who was bearing a letter negotiating terms when he died. Thus, the army entered Iraqi politics, and it was not until Hassan al-Bakr and Hussein arrived in 1968 that Ba'athism tamed the armed forces and emasculated the generals.

In 1958, by killing King Faisal II and his family, Colonel Abd-al-Karim Qasim finally rid the nation of the artificial monarchy the British had imposed on them. Qasim tried to mold Iraqis into one people through the symbols of Nebucanezzer and ancient Mesopotamia but forgot the cardinal rule of first providing for the welfare of his people.

The Ba'athist and Communists joined with the Kurds to topple Qasim and usher in General Abd-al-Salam Arif. Hussein, who was in exile in Egypt after a failed assassination attempt on Qasim, returned and developed the Ba'athist Party's own security force. He created the Jihaz-Haneen, which dispensed remorseless terror to intimidate and con the population. Clashes between Arif, who was pro-Nasser, and the Ba'athists, who wanted to keep Iraq isolated and under their control, led to a coup in 1968 that brought Hussein and his cousin General Hassan al-Bakr to power.

Ba'athism was developed in 1932 by Michel Aflaq and Salah-al-Din Bitaar as a means of divorcing religion from Arabism. The Ba'athists argued that an Arab state existed before Islam and Christianity, and that Iraq should return to this identity to have greater power. Michel Aflaq's writings are heavily influenced by Marxism and German nationalism. Many intellectuals call Ba'athism a form of Arab National Socialism; to Hussein it was a means of maintaining his dictatorship.

The Jihaaz-Haneen developed by Hussein morphed into the Mukhabarat, an intelligence and internal security apparatus. Mackey writes about the 1969 public executions designed to instill fear in opponents. Liquidations of Communists and those affiliated with the old regimes of Qasim and Arif began and Ba'athists who were ideologues or who had their own rival power base within the party were executed. Al-Bakr and Hussein, who were Tikritis, appointed their own kin to positions of power, a practice that became so obvious last names were officially dropped to obscure the fact that many in power, like Hussein, had the last name al-Tikiriti.

The book describes how Hussein subdued Shiite and Kurd rebellions. Many believe the village of Halabja was the only Kurdish town gassed by Hussein, but the book describes how Hussein gassed over 67 Kurdish villages. The final chapter reveals the vulnerabilities of Hussein and subtribes within his clan that fought for the dictator's favor.

Mackey's book is an important contribution to understanding Iraqi society. The United States must not make the same mistake the British made in ignoring the Iraqis' identity crisis.

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